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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Subsection 4(b)(2) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”) provides an exemption for 
church plans. These plans need not comply with a host of 
ERISA provisions, including fiduciary obligations and 
minimum-funding rules. ERISA § 3(33)(A) defines a church 
plan as one that is “established and maintained . . . for its 
employees (or their beneficiaries)” by a tax-exempt church. 
Subsection 3(33)(C)(i) clarifies that a “plan established and 
maintained” by a church includes a plan maintained by a 
qualifying agency of a church. But can a church agency, in 
addition to maintaining an exempt church plan, also establish 




agree. Per the plain text of ERISA, only a church can 
establish a plan that qualifies for an exemption under 
§ 4(b)(2).1 Because no church established St. Peter’s 
Healthcare System’s retirement plan, we hold that it is 
ineligible for a church plan exemption.  
I.  Background 
 St. Peter’s is a non-profit healthcare entity that runs a 
variety of facilities, including a hospital, and employs over 
2,800 people. Though it is not a church, St. Peter’s has ties to 
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Metuchen, New Jersey. For 
instance, the Bishop of Metuchen appoints all but two 
members of its Board of Governors. The Bishop also retains 
veto authority over the Board’s actions. Meanwhile, the 
hospital run by St. Peter’s features numerous indicia of the 
church relationship, including daily Mass and the presence of 
Catholic devotional pictures and statues throughout the 
building.  
 St. Peter’s established the retirement plan before us in 
1974. It is a non-contributory defined benefit plan, and it 
covers substantially all employees of St. Peter’s hired before 
July 1, 2010. For more than three decades, St. Peter’s 
operated the plan subject to ERISA and represented to its 
employees in plan documents and other materials that it was 
complying with ERISA. Eventually, however, St. Peter’s 
began to consider whether the church plan exemption might 
apply to its retirement plan. To that end, it filed an application 
in 2006 with the Internal Revenue Service seeking such an 
exemption. The Internal Revenue Code borrows its definition 
of a church plan from ERISA. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(e). 
                                              
1 Subsection 4(b)(2) of ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C. 





Although the application signaled the belief of St. Peter’s that 
it qualified for an ERISA exemption, it continued to pay 
ERISA-mandated insurance premiums for the retirement plan 
while the application was pending.  
 In May 2013, Laurence Kaplan, who worked for St. 
Peter’s from 1985 to 1999, filed a putative class action 
alleging that St. Peter’s failed to comply with various ERISA 
obligations.2 Among other things, the complaint alleged that, 
in the years after St. Peter’s filed the application for a church 
plan exemption, it did not provide ERISA-compliant 
summary plan descriptions or pension benefits statements. 
The most serious allegation was that, as of the end of 2011, 
the plan was underfunded by more than $70 million.3 In 
August 2013, while the lawsuit was pending, St. Peter’s 
received a private letter ruling from the IRS affirming the 
plan’s status as an exempt church plan for tax purposes.4  
 St. Peter’s moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that it 
qualified for ERISA’s church plan exemption and hence was 
not required to comply with the provisions Kaplan claimed it 
had violated. Specifically, St. Peter’s argued that the claimed 
exemption robbed the District Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the ERISA allegations and in the alternative 
                                              
2 The complaint also names certain individuals employed by 
St. Peter’s. We refer to these individuals and their employer 
collectively as “St. Peter’s.” 
 
3 On appeal, Kaplan focuses on numbers from 2014. He says 
that those show that the plan was underfunded at that time by 
approximately $30 million. See Appellee’s Br. at 5.  
 
4 As discussed in Part VII, this private letter ruling does not 




that the complaint failed to state a claim. The District Court 
denied the motion after concluding that St. Peter’s could not 
establish an exempt church plan because it is not a church. 
 In reviewing the District Court’s conclusion, we do not 
write on a blank slate. In the decades following the current 
church plan definition’s enactment in 1980, various courts 
have assumed that entities that are not themselves churches, 
but have sufficiently strong ties to churches, can establish 
exempt church plans. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. 
v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84–85 (D. Me. 2004); 
Humphrey v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 979 F. 
Supp. 781, 785–86 (N.D. Ind. 1997). The only Circuit to 
consider the question came to the same conclusion, albeit in a 
dictum. See Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 547 (4th 
Cir. 2001). However, a new wave of litigation, of which this 
case is a part, has sprung up in the past few years and has 
presented an argument not previously considered by courts—
that the actual words of the church plan definition preclude 
this result.  
 Riding this new wave, three other courts have agreed 
with the District Court here that only churches can establish 
exempt church plans. See Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care 
Network, 76 F. Supp. 3d 796, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Medina v. 
Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 13-CV-01249, 2014 WL 
3408690, at *9 (D. Colo. July 9, 2014); Rollins v. Dignity 
Health, 19 F. Supp. 3d 909, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2013). By 
contrast, three courts have ruled that plans established and 
maintained by church agencies can qualify for an exemption. 
See Lann v. Trinity Health Corp., No. 8:14-cv-02237 (D. Md. 
Feb. 23, 2015) (ECF No. 54 at 1); Medina v. Catholic Health 




Colo. Aug. 26, 2014);5 Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 
816, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2014). The Seventh Circuit heard 
argument in Stapleton on September 18, 2015, but we are the 
first Circuit to decide the question in a holding.  
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). St. Peter’s filed a motion 
to dismiss, which the District Court denied. However, the 
Court permitted St. Peter’s to seek leave from us to appeal, 
and we accepted the interlocutory appeal. We thus have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Our review of 
questions of law certified under this provision is plenary. See 
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 
621 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III.  The Church Plan Exemption 
 When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, § 3(33) 
defined a church plan as follows: 
 (33)(A) The term “church plan” means 
(i) a plan established and maintained for its 
employees by a church or by a convention or 
                                              
5 The August 26, 2014 District Court opinion in Medina, 
written by Judge Blackburn, was on review of the July 9, 
2014 opinion, written by Magistrate Judge Mix. Judge 
Blackburn rejected Magistrate Judge Mix’s recommendation. 
In a later opinion, Judge Blackburn granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on the basis of a church plan 
exemption. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 13-CV-





association of churches which is exempt from 
tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, or (ii) a plan described in 
subparagraph (C). 
. . .  
 (C) . . . [A] plan in existence on January 
1, 1974, shall be treated as a “church plan” if it 
is established and maintained by a church or 
convention or association of churches for its 
employees and employees of one or more 
agencies of such church (or convention or 
association) . . . , and if such church (or 
convention or association) and each such 
agency is exempt from tax under section 501 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The first 
sentence of this subparagraph shall not apply to 
any plan maintained for employees of an 
agency with respect to which the plan was not 
maintained on January 1, 1974. The first 
sentence of this subparagraph shall not apply 
with respect to any plan for any plan year 
beginning after December 31, 1982.  
 In the years following ERISA’s enactment, this 
definition led to two problems, both of which are summarized 
here but discussed in more detail in Part VI below. First, 
experience showed that many churches established their own 
plans but relied on church pension boards for plan 
maintenance. Churches that followed this practice were 
concerned that their plans might not technically qualify as 
“established and maintained” by a church. Second, churches 
wanted the ability to continue to cover the employees of 
church agencies, such as church hospitals, after the sunset 




Congress addressed both concerns as part of the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 
which amended § 3(33) as follows: 
 (33)(A) The term “church plan” means a 
plan established and maintained . . . for its 
employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church 
or by a convention or association of churches 
which is exempt from tax under section 501 of 
Title 26.   
. . .  
 (C) For purposes of [paragraph 33]—  
(i) A plan established and maintained for 
its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a 
church or by a convention or association 
of churches includes a plan maintained 
by an organization, whether a civil law 
corporation or otherwise, the principal 
purpose or function of which is the 
administration or funding of a plan or 
program for the provision of retirement 
benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for 
the employees of a church or a 
convention or association of churches, if 
such organization is controlled by or 
associated with a church or a convention 
or association of churches.6 
                                              
6 Although the statute speaks in terms of churches along with 
conventions or associations of churches, for ease of reference 
we refer to them collectively as “churches.” Additionally, we 




 (ii) The term employee of a church or a 
convention or association of churches 
includes— 
(I) a duly ordained, commissioned, or 
licensed minister of a church in 
the exercise of his ministry, 
regardless of the source of his 
compensation; 
(II) an employee of an organization, 
whether a civil law corporation or 
otherwise, which is exempt from 
tax under section 501 of Title 
26 and which is controlled by or 
associated with a church or a 
convention or association of 
churches . . . . 
This new definition solved both of the issues that 
stemmed from the 1974 definition. Specifically, new 
§ 3(33)(C)(i) unambiguously brought within the exemption 
plans established by churches but maintained by church 
pension boards. And new § 3(33)(C)(ii) allowed churches to 
establish plans that covered church agency employees even 
after the sunset provision kicked in at the end of 1982.  
However, St. Peter’s argues that the 1980 amendments 
also accomplished a third result—annulling the requirement 
that a church establish a plan in order for it to qualify for an 
exemption. Under its proposed reading, any plan can qualify 
for the exemption regardless of who establishes it as long as it 
meets the maintenance requirements of § 3(33)(C)(i). As 
                                                                                                     
§ 3(33)(C)(i) interchangeably as “church agencies” or 




noted below, we believe this reading fails to follow the actual 
words of the provision.  
IV.  Plain Meaning 
 We start our review, as we must, with a familiar 
question: Do the words of the statute have “a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in 
the case”? Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the statute 
has a plain meaning, and that meaning sets the result. 
 Subsection 3(33)(A) requires that all exempt plans be 
established by a church. Prior to 1980, a plan needed to be 
established and maintained by a church. The 1980 
amendments provided an alternate way of meeting the 
maintenance requirement by allowing plans maintained by 
church agencies to fall within the exemption. But they did not 
do away with the requirement that a church establish a plan in 
the first instance. As the District Court explained,  
[t]he key to this interpretation is to recognize 
that subsection [3(33)]A is the gatekeeper to the 
church plan exemption: although the church 
plan definition, as defined in subsection A, is 
expanded by subsection C to include plans 
maintained by a tax-exempt organization, it 
nevertheless requires that the plan be 
established by a church or a convention or 
association of churches. In other words, if a 
church does not establish the plan, the inquiry 
ends there. If, on the other hand, a church 
establishes the plan, the remaining sections of 




Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941, 2014 
WL 1284854, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014) (emphases in 
original). 
 St. Peter’s responds by arguing that the language of 
§ 3(33)(C)(i), which says that a plan “established and 
maintained” by a church “includes” a plan “maintained” by a 
qualifying church agency, means that any plan maintained, 
even if not established, by such an agency is exempt. This 
would be persuasive if there were only one requirement—
maintenance—for an exemption. But here we have two 
requirements—establishment and maintenance—and only the 
latter is expanded by the use of “includes.”  
 Indeed, St. Peter’s essentially conceded the problem 
with its reading at oral argument when presented with the 
following scenario: Congress passes a law that any person 
who is disabled and a veteran is entitled to free insurance. In 
the ensuing years, there is a question about whether people 
who served in the National Guard are veterans for purposes of 
the statute. To clarify, Congress passes an amendment saying 
that, for purposes of the provision, “a person who is disabled 
and a veteran includes a person who served in the National 
Guard.” Asked if a person who served in the National Guard 
but is not disabled qualifies to collect free insurance, St. 
Peter’s responded that such a person does not because only 
the second of the two conditions was satisfied. This correct 
response only serves to highlight the fatal flaw in the 
construction of ERISA advanced by St. Peter’s.  
V.  Canons of Construction 
 Various canons of statutory construction add to the 
problems with the reading proposed by St. Peter’s. First, if St. 
Peter’s were right, the church establishment requirement in 




regardless of who established it, would be eligible for an 
exemption as long as it is maintained by an entity that meets 
the requirements of § 3(33)(C)(i). Creating such superfluous 
language is a result we attempt to avoid when construing a 
statute. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997) 
(noting that it is a “cardinal principle of statutory 
construction” to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and 
word of a statute”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is 
particularly so where a contrary reading would “nullif[y]” a 
statute’s “careful limitation.” Id. Here, Congress carefully 
limited the church plan exemption to only those plans 
established by a church. In interpreting the statute, we must 
give meaning to this limitation. 
 Second, in cases where Congress “includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). This canon 
is known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express 
one is to exclude others). Here, Congress could have said that 
a plan “established and maintained” by a church includes a 
plan “established and maintained” by a church agency. But 
the final legislation did not say that. Tellingly, however, draft 
legislation introduced in 1978 by Representative Barber B. 
Conable, Jr. to amend the Internal Revenue Code had 
precisely that language. See Kaplan, 2014 WL 1284854, at *9 
n.4 (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. 12108 (May 2, 1978)). If 
Representative Conable’s text had been adopted, it would be 
quite clear that church establishment of a plan would no 
longer be a prerequisite for the exemption. But by the time 




“established” was gone.7 This deletion from one version to 
another “is fairly seen . . . as a deliberate elimination of any 
possibility” of construing the statute to have the meaning it 
would have had in the rejected version. Doe v. Chao, 540 
U.S. 614, 623 (2004). 
 Third, we have noted that ERISA is a “remedial” 
statute that should be “liberally construed in favor of 
protecting the participants in employee benefit plans.” IUE 
AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 
F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986). As certain of the amici explain, 
exempt church plans lack many of the protections associated 
with ERISA. Features that ERISA plans have that church 
plans need not follow include fiduciary duties and minimum-
funding protections. See, e.g., Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Assoc. & 
AARP Found. Amicus Br. at 11–19. Excluding plans 
established by church agencies could take a large number of 
employees outside the scope of these ERISA protections. For 
instance, as of 2012 religiously affiliated hospitals accounted 
for seven of the country’s ten largest non-profit healthcare 
systems. ACLU & Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State Amicus Br. at 22. As the District Court 
noted, construing plans established by church hospitals to be 
exempt “would achieve quite the opposite” result of the canon 
directing us to construe exemptions narrowly. Kaplan, 2014 
WL 1284854, at *6.  
                                              
7 Viewed in light of the purpose of the provision, the use of 
the current language rather than Rep. Conable’s version 
makes sense. As discussed in Part VI below, the purpose of 
§ 3(33)(C)(i) was not to deal with a plan established and 
maintained by a church agency but rather to account for a 
plan established by a church and maintained by its pension 




 St. Peter’s, for its part, contends that a fourth canon, 
construing provisions in light of their statutory neighbors, 
favors its reading. Specifically, it points to ERISA’s 
governmental plan exemption. ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C 
§ 1002(32), defines an exempt governmental plan to mean “a 
plan established or maintained for its employees by the 
Government of the United States, by the government of any 
State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or 
instrumentality of any of the foregoing.” The provision goes 
on to say that an exempt governmental plan “includes,” 
among other options, certain plans to which the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1935 applies and certain plans “established 
and maintained” by Native American tribal governments. St. 
Peter’s uses this as an example of an instance in which the 
initial definition of an exempt plan is enlarged through the 
use of “includes.”   
 But the governmental plan provision hurts, not helps, 
St. Peter’s. It shows that Congress considers “established” 
and “maintained” to be different terms, as either is sufficient 
for the plans of the federal government and state 
governments, but both are required for Native American tribal 
plans. For the church plan exemption before us, Congress did 
not, as it did with plans of the federal government and state 
governments, say that either establishment or maintenance is 
sufficient for ERISA exemption. Rather, Congress explicitly 
required both (subject to the caveat that the second 
requirement could be met in the case of a plan maintained by 
a qualifying church agency). 





 In this context, even if St. Peter’s may maintain an 
exempt church plan,8 it cannot establish one. The plain terms 
of ERISA only make these exemptions available to plans 
established in the first instance by churches. Because St. 
Peter’s is not a church, the exemption is unavailable, and it is 
not entitled to dismissal of Kaplan’s complaint on that basis.  
                                              
8 Although we need not decide the issue, we have substantial 
reservations over whether St. Peter’s can even maintain an 
exempt plan. Subsection 3(33)(C)(i) requires that if a plan is 
to be maintained by an organization that is not a church, it 
must be an organization “the principal purpose or function of 
which is the administration or funding of a plan or program 
for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or 
both, for the employees of a church or a convention or 
association of churches . . . .” In addition, the same subsection 
requires that the organization be “controlled by or associated 
with a church or a convention or association of churches.” 
Setting aside whether St. Peter’s is controlled by or associated 
with a church (as that depends on disputed facts not properly 
resolvable at the motion-to-dismiss stage), St. Peter’s itself 
does not appear to meet the principal purpose test, as its 
principal purpose is the provision of healthcare and not the 
administration or funding of the retirement plan. St. Peter’s 
contends, however, that its Retirement Plan Committee 
qualifies because the Committee’s principal purpose is to 
maintain the plan. However, this may be insufficient. See 
Rollins, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 914 (“[T]he statute does not say 
that the organization may have a subcommittee who deals 
with plan administration. Rather, the statute dictates that [the] 
organization itself must have benefits plan administration as 





VI.  Legislative History 
 Because the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we 
need go no further. However, because the parties have 
devoted considerable resources to briefing and arguing the 
legislative history of the church plan exemption, we turn to it 
now. Even if the statute were ambiguous and the legislative 
history bore on our analysis, the result would be the same. 
Indeed, the legislative history of § 3(33) reinforces our 
conclusion that the exemption is only available to plans 
established by churches. Specifically, that history 
demonstrates that the purposes of the 1980 amendments were 
to account for plans established by churches but maintained 
by church agencies (hence the adoption of § 3(33)(C)(i)) and 
to extend the sunset provision set to take effect at the end of 
1982 (thus the adoption of § 3(33)(C)(ii)).  
 St. Peter’s places great emphasis on the following floor 
statement from Senator Herman Talmadge, a co-sponsor of 
the 1980 church plan amendments, regarding the purpose of 
the 1980 language: 
 Church agencies are essential to the 
churches’ mission. They are for the sick and 
needy and disseminate religious instruction. 
They are, in fact, part of the churches. As a 
practical matter, it is doubtful that the agency 
plans would survive subjection to ERISA. 
There is an essential difference between the 
plans of business[es] and the plans of church 
institutions. If a business incurs increased plan 
maintenance costs, it merely passes these on to 
the consumer. The incomes of most church 
agencies, on the other hand, are dependent 
solely upon tithes and other offerings. There is 




additional costs of complying with ERISA. The 
churches fear that many of the agencies would 
abandon their plans. We are concerned today 
that the requirements of ERISA [have] made the 
maintenance of plans too expensive and 
demanding even for businesses which have the 
capacity to absorb additional costs. The impact 
of ERISA on church agencies would be many 
times as serious as that on businesses.  
JA 122.9  
 St. Peter’s contends that this statement makes clear 
that Congress was focused on plans established by church 
agencies. Not so. Rather, the context demonstrates that 
Senator Talmadge’s real concern was the sunset provision set 
to take effect at the end of 1982. As discussed, the initial 
definition of a church plan was one “established and 
maintained for its employees by a church.” Existing plans 
established and maintained by churches were allowed to 
cover employees of church agencies, but only until the end of 
1982. This was not a question of who established and 
maintained the plans, as only churches could. Instead, the 
issue was that no exempt plans would be allowed to cover 
agency employees after 1982 (unless the agency itself 
qualified as a church). Indeed, Senator Talmadge made the 
comments above in the context of explaining why churches, 
after 1982, would need to “divide their plans into two so that 
one will cover church employees and the other . . . agency 
employees.” Id. Absent an amendment, the plans in the latter 
category would not qualify for the exemption. That was the 
real threat to plans covering agency employees.  
                                              




 The reliance of St. Peter’s on statements by Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Halperin during a 
hearing on the proposed legislation is similarly misplaced. St. 
Peter’s highlights his statement that Treasury’s “most serious 
concern” was that the amendments “would exclude church 
agencies from the protection of ERISA, and that would mean 
that if somebody works for a hospital or a school that happens 
to be affiliated with a church it would be permissible for that 
plan to provide no retirement benefits unless they work until 
age 65, for example.” Appellants’ Addendum at 8. This does 
not help St. Peter’s. Assistant Secretary Halperin was merely 
pointing out that, if the sunset provision took effect, 
employees of church agencies could not be included within 
the then-existing exemption, and a plan covering them would 
instead be subject to ERISA even if a church itself established 
it. However, nothing in the statement connotes that plans 
established by church agencies would be eligible for the 
exemption.  
 Similarly, St. Peter’s does not benefit from the 
statement of Senator Jacob Javits, the general sponsor of the 
legislation in which the 1980 amendments were included. 
Senator Javits said that he was “not too happy” that the 
amendments would exempt “those who work for schools and 
similar institutions which are church-related.” JA 1524. 
Again, this relates to Congress’ decision not to allow the 
sunset provision to take effect.  
 More to the point, the legislative history demonstrates 
that the purpose of § 3(33)(C)(i), the statutory provision on 
which St. Peter’s most heavily relies, was to bring explicitly 
within the exemption plans established by churches but 
maintained by church agencies known as pension boards. 
Senator Talmadge explained that “the church plan definition 
is so narrowly drawn that it does not in many ways even 




JA 122. He mentioned congregational, as opposed to 
hierarchical, denominations, noting: “Most church plans of 
congregational denominations are administered by a pension 
board. This is usually an organization separately incorporated 
from, but controlled by, the denomination.” Id. There was 
some confusion as to whether such a structure qualified for an 
exemption. Id. As Senator Talmadge explained to the Senate 
Committee on Finance, the amendments dealt with that issue 
by expanding the definition to include “church plans which 
rather than being maintained directly by a church are instead 
maintained by a pension board maintained by a church.” 
Senate Committee on Finance, Executive Session Minutes, 
June 12, 1980, at 40.   
 St. Peter’s, despite a lengthy discussion of legislative 
history, has not pointed to a single statement showing that 
Congress, in addition to being concerned about the sunset 
provision and plans maintained by pension boards (i.e., 
church agencies), was also focused on plans established by 
those agencies. Rather, that history overwhelmingly supports 
the conclusion that Congress did not intend to open up the 
exemption that broadly. 
VII.  IRS Rulings 
 St. Peter’s also seeks to imbue with considerable 
weight the interpretation that the IRS has given to the church 
plan definition. As discussed, the Internal Revenue Code gets 
its definition of church plans from ERISA. Construing the 
initial 1974 definition, the IRS took the position that 
healthcare companies with religious missions were not 
eligible for the church plan exemption because they were not 
performing sufficiently religious functions. I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 37,266 (Sept. 22, 1977). Essentially, the IRS’ 
position was that only church agencies that themselves could 




 But the IRS changed course in 1983 based on its 
interpretation of the 1980 amendments and began issuing 
exemptions to plans that were not established by churches. A 
1983 IRS memorandum stated that because “religious orders 
can now have their employees covered by a church plan 
without a determination that such orders are churches, [an 
order’s] nonchurch status is not fatal.” I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,007 (July 1, 1983). According to St. Peter’s, the IRS 
has issued at least several hundred exemptions based on that 
reasoning. And, as discussed, St. Peter’s itself received an 
exemption from the IRS in 2013, after this lawsuit was filed. 
St. Peter’s also notes that the Department of Labor has issued 
several exemptions of its own based on the IRS’ position.  
 However, because the IRS’ position came in a general 
counsel memorandum and not as a result of “formal 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,” its 
interpretation is owed deference “only to the extent that [it 
has] the power to persuade.” Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 
U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
IRS’ 1983 memorandum lacks the power to persuade because 
it does not even consider the church establishment 
requirement of § 3(33)(A). Rather, it skips directly (and 
inexplicably) to § 3(33)(C). Because the IRS’ position is at 
odds with the statutory text, we owe it no deference.  
VIII.  Congressional Ratification 
 St. Peter’s also advances a congressional ratification 
argument. Specifically, it notes that, following the IRS’ 1983 
memorandum, Congress has incorporated the church plan 
definition from the 1980 amendments into a variety of other 
laws. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(3)(C) (excluding 
church plans from certain minimum excise taxes imposed on 
health plans); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(14) (excluding church 




Investment Company Act of 1940). From this, St. Peter’s 
contends that Congress legislated against the backdrop of the 
1983 IRS memorandum and should be presumed to have 
approved that interpretation when reusing the definition.  
 It is true as a general matter that when it “adopts a new 
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally 
can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation 
given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the 
new statute.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978). 
However, in Lorillard “Congress exhibited . . .  a detailed 
knowledge of the [statutory] provisions and their . . . 
interpretation.” Id. St. Peter’s has not shown any evidence 
that Congress had such a detailed knowledge in this case. 
Moreover, ratification does not apply where, as is the case 
here, the statute has a plain meaning that is inconsistent with 
the proposed interpretation. Dutton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 5 
F.3d 649, 655 (3d Cir. 1993). As a result, ratification cannot 
salvage things for St. Peter’s.  
IX.  Free Exercise Clause 
 Finally, St. Peter’s raises an argument under the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. It asserts that failing to 
adopt its position would create constitutional “[i]ssues.” 
Appellants’ Br. at 47. It is not clear whether St. Peter’s is 
invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance or is instead 
raising a full-blown constitutional challenge. In any event, the 
argument fails. St. Peter’s bases its constitutional concerns on 
the premise that, if church agencies cannot establish their own 
plans, the IRS will be forced, in considering requests for 
exemptions, to determine on an individualized basis whether 
particular agencies are performing sufficiently religious 
functions such that they can themselves qualify as churches. 
This is the approach the IRS took to agency-established plans 




point. Churches and agencies can avoid this inquiry altogether 
by having a church establish the plan in the first instance. 
Plans established by churches are explicitly permitted under 
§ 3(33)(C)(ii) to cover agency employees.  
 St. Peter’s has not offered any reason why the First 
Amendment entitles it to a retirement plan structured using a 
particular corporate form. The ability of church agencies to 
have their employees covered by exempt plans is by no 
means eliminated by our reading. We have merely determined 
that Congress has required that such coverage come in the 
form of plans established by churches. Even assuming that St. 
Peter’s has a constitutional right to have its employees 
covered by an exempt plan, this arrangement does not unduly 
interfere with that.  
 Moreover, to the extent that St. Peter’s also suggests 
that Congress cannot validly distinguish between churches 
and church agencies, that argument is unpersuasive. Indeed, 
Congress regularly applies provisions to churches without 
reference to church agencies. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 
§ 514(b)(3)(E) (creating a special rule for churches with 
respect to real property acquired for tax-exempt use); 26 
U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (allowing deductions for charitable 
contributions to churches). See also Priests for Life v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 272 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) 
(No. 14-1453) (describing the distinction between “churches . . 
. and nonprofit organizations that may have a religious 
character or affiliation, such as universities and hospitals” as 
“long-recognized” and “permissible”); Found. of Human 
Understanding v. United States, 614 F.3d 1383, 1389 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (noting, in context of 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i), 
the “generally accepted principle” that Congress intended to 





* * * * * 
 In interpreting a statute, we presume that Congress 
means what it says. Ever since it enacted ERISA in 1974, 
establishment of a pension plan by a church has been a 
prerequisite to triggering the exemption from ERISA. 
Nothing in the 1980 amendments changed that. St. Peter’s 
sought dismissal of the putative class action on the ground 
that its plan qualifies for the church plan exemption. 
However, that exemption is unavailable here, as the plan was 
not established by a church. We therefore affirm the District 
Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.  
 
